We propose the "average approach," where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the -egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.
Introduction
A central question in game theory is how players can share the gains from cooperation. Shapley (1953) addresses this issue for cooperative games in characteristic function form, where the description of a game specifies the resources every group of players has available for distribution among its members. He proposes the use of a sharing rule, or a value (known as the "Shapley value"), that satisfies the axioms of symmetry, carrier (which amounts to the efficiency plus dummy player axioms), and additivity. The Shapley value has been studied, interpreted, and characterized in many different ways. 1 Interestingly, it arises from apparently distinct and unrelated approaches (axiomatic, marginalistic, potential, dividends). In addition, it has been extremely influential in later proposals for surplus sharing. Many researchers have followed the path Lloyd Shapley laid out and put forward some modifications of the Shapley axioms to define new values for sharing the surplus generated through cooperation.
A shortcoming of describing a cooperative environment through a characteristic function form game is that it disregards the possible existence of externalities among groups.
Externalities in economic or political environments are the norm rather than the exception. For instance, research joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, international negotiations on environmental issues, and trade agreements all exhibit important cross effects, namely, the gain that a group of agents obtains depends on the groups formed by the other players. A formal description of such settings with externalities is given by Thrall and Lucas (1963) who introduce games in partition function form.
To allow value theory to address environments with externalities, several papers adapt and at times augment the Shapley axioms of efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player to partition function form games. This leads to several new sharing methods for environments with externalities (see, e.g., Myerson, 1977; Bolger, 1989 In this paper, we suggest a unifying method, the "average approach," of extending 1 See, for instance, Roth (1988). 2 Different methods to extend the Shapley value are proposed by de Clippel and Serrano (2008), who rely on the marginal approach, and by Dutta, Elhers, and Kar (2010) , who use the potential approach. any value for characteristic function form games that satisfies the above axioms of efficiency, symmetry, and linearity to partition function form games. The average approach associates to each group of players a worth that is some weighted average of what the group can obtain for all possible partitions of the other players. This yields a game with no externalities, the value of which determines the value for the original game. The axiomatic basis for this procedure is given by a natural extension of the symmetry axiom for partition form games, the "strong symmetry axiom," introduced by Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo, and Wettstein (2007) (MPW, 2007, hereafter) . The strong symmetry axiom captures the idea that all players with identical influence in a game should receive the same outcome. It is also related to the property of equal treatment of equals.
We use this approach to propose extensions of several well-known values as well as families of values defined for games without externalities. In addition, we suggest generalizations of the axioms proposed for characteristic function form games (such as nullifying player, neutral dummy player, or coalitional monotonicity), to adapt them to situations with externalities. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value (Van den Brink, 2007) , the equal surplus value (Driessen and Funaki, 1991) , the consensus value (Ju, Borm, and Ruys, 2007) , the -egalitarian Shapley value (Joosten, 1996) , and the family of least-square values (Ruiz, Valenciano, and Zarzuelo, 1998) . For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. It is worth noting that the extension of the consensus value through the average approach coincides with the one proposed by Ju (2007) . 3 For each of the last two extensions, a family of values that satisfy the properties is found.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the environment. Section 3 introduces the basic axioms and the average approach. Sections 4 and 5 present the extensions of several values and families of values. Finally, section 6 briefly concludes.
The environment
The environment we study can be described as follows. We denote by  = {1  } the set of players. A coalition  is a group of  players, that is, a subset of   ⊆ . An embedded coalition specifies the coalition as well as the structure of coalitions formed by the other players, that is, an embedded coalition is a pair (  ), where  is a coalition and  3  is a partition of . Let P be the set of all partitions of . We use the convention that the empty set ∅ is in  for every  ∈ P. We denote by P  = { ∈ P |  ∈  } the set of partitions including . Then, the set of embedded coalitions, , is defined as:
We denote by  a game in partition function form (PFF), where  :  → R is a function that associates a real number with each embedded coalition (  ). We assume that the function satisfies (∅  ) = 0 for all  ∈ P. Let G  be the set of games in PFF with players in . We interpret (  ) as the worth of coalition  when the players are organized according to the partition  . In our set up, players in a coalition can make transfers among them, that is, we consider transferable utility (TU) games. The worth (  ) may depend on the partition  . This implies that the organization of the players outside  may create a positive or negative externality on the payoff that players in a coalition  can jointly obtain.
An important class of games with externalities that forms a basis for the set G  is given by the games   defined by
In the game   ∈ G  there are only two scenarios where a coalition has a positive worth, the first is for the coalition  when the players are organized according to the partition  , and the second is for the grand coalition. We will refer to this class of games as the "canonical basis" for G  .
Some games in G  do not have externalities. A game is without externalities if the worth of any coalition  is independent of the way the other players are organized. A game without externalities satisfies (  ) = (  0 ) for any   0 ∈ P  and any coalition  ⊆ . We denote such a game by Since the worth of a coalition  in the game can be written without reference to the organization of the remaining players, we can writê () ≡(  ) for all  ∈ P  and all  ⊆ . We denote by   the set of games without externalities with players in , which corresponds to the set of TU games in characteristic function form (CFF).
A solution concept for PFF games, or a value, is a mapping  which associates with every game  ∈ G  a vector in R  , specifying the payoff of each player, that satisfies P ∈   () = ( ( ∅)). Thus, in this paper, a value always shares the worth of the grand coalition, that is, it satisfies the efficiency axiom.
Similarly, a value for CFF games is a mapping  which associates with every gamê
3 Basic axioms and the average approach Shapley (1953) proposes linearity and symmetry as reasonable requirements to impose on values for CFF games. To introduce these axioms, we first define some operations on the set of CFF games.
The addition of two games and 0 in   is defined as the game+ 0 where (+ 0 )() ≡() + 0 () for all  ⊆ . Similarly, given the game and the scalar  ∈ R the game  is defined by ()() ≡ () for all  ⊆ .
Let  be a permutation of  Then the  permutation of the game ∈   denoted by  is defined by ()() ≡() for all  ⊆  C1 Linearity: A value for CFF games  satisfies the linearity axiom if:
C1.2
For any game and any scalar  ∈ R () = ().
C2 Symmetry: A value for CFF games  satisfies the symmetry axiom if for any permutation  of , () = ().
In this paper, we focus on the family of values that, in addition to efficiency, satisfy symmetry and linearity.
The operations, and the linearity and symmetry axioms can be easily extended to PFF games. The addition of two games  and  0 in G  is defined as the game  +  0
Also, given the game  and the scalar  ∈ R the game  is defined by
Similarly, the  permutation of the game  ∈ G  denoted by  is defined by
Then we can define two basic axioms for a value :
P1 Linearity: A value  satisfies the linearity axiom if:
P1.2 For any game  and any scalar  ∈ R () = ().
P2 Symmetry: A value  satisfies the symmetry axiom if for any permutation  of ,
The symmetry axiom imposes much more structure on a value for CFF games than it does on a value for PFF games. In the standard basis for CFF games, given by unanimity games, symmetry implies that all the players outside a winning coalition obtain the same value. In the canonical basis for PFF games, symmetry does not suffice to pin down the values for players outside the "winning" coalition. Thus, the strong symmetry axiom strengthens the symmetry axiom by requiring that the payoff of a player should not change after permutations in the set of players in \ for any embedded coalition structure (  ). It imposes in addition to symmetric treatment of individual players, the symmetric treatment of "externalities" generated by players in a given embedded coalition structure. As a consequence, exchanging the names of the players inducing externalities does not affect the payoff of any player.
Formally, given an embedded coalition (  ), we denote by    a new partition such that  ∈    and the other coalitions result from a permutation of the set \ applied to  \. That is, in the partition    the players in \ are reorganized in sets whose size distribution is the same as in  \. Given the permutation Formally, the average approach constructs a value  for PFF games using a value for CFF games  as follows. First, for any game  ∈ G  , it constructs an average game by assigning to each  ⊆  the average worth()
We refer to (  ) as the "weight" of the partition  in the computation of the value of coalition  ∈  . We restrict attention to symmetric and nonnegative weights, that is, (  ) ≥ 0 and it depends solely on the size of the coalition  and the size distribution of the coalitions in  . 4 Second, we define   () =   () 
The following theorem establishes the relationship between the average approach and the strong symmetry axiom, when we consider symmetric and linear values for CFF. Thus, it establishes an axiomatic foundation for the use of the average approach.
Theorem 1 The value  can be constructed through the average approach using a value for CFF games  that satisfies linearity and symmetry if and only if  satisfies linearity and strong symmetry.
The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive in part and relies heavily on the linearity axiom that allows to extend properties over a "basis" for G  , to all of G  . We also make use of the fact that the value for CFF games  generating a value for PFF games  is uniquely determined by , since both values must coincide for CFF games, when viewed as PFF games (without externalities). Besides its intuitive appeal, as we will see shortly, the average approach provides a structured method of extending CFF values satisfying linearity and symmetry to linear and (strongly) symmetric PFF values.
To gain further understanding of the use of the average approach, we introduce an equal treatment axiom for PFF games, which is shown to be equivalent to the strong symmetry axiom. 5 In CFF games, we say that players  and  are interchangeable in ∈   if() =  (\{} ∪ {}) for all  where  ∈  and  ∈  \. Then, C3 Equal Treatment: A value for CFF games  satisfies the equal treatment axiom if   () =   () whenever  and  are interchangeable in. 6 To state a strong version for PFF games of equal treatment, we define a weak version of interchangeability: players  and  are weakly
linear values. This property allows us, in the Appendix, to sometimes use the expression ( ) instead of (  ) for the weights, where  is the vector describing the size distribution of the coalitions in the partition  . 5 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to study the relationship between equal treatment and strong symmetry. 6 The equal treatment property was first mentioned in Aumann and Shapley (1974) . Note that for efficient and linear values in CFF games, symmetry and equal treatment are equivalent.
That is, players  and  are weakly interchangeable in a game  if for any coalition  including one of them, switching them does not affect the value of any embedded coalition (  ). For example, in a game   0  0 in the canonical basis all players in  0 are weakly interchangeable as are all players in \ 0 .
P3 Strong Equal Treatment property: A value  satisfies the strong equal treatment property if, for any weakly interchangeable players  and  in ,
For games   in the canonical basis, the strong equal treatment property implies
Next we show that strong equal treatment and strong symmetry are equivalent for linear (and efficient) values.
Theorem 2 A linear value  satisfies strong symmetry if and only if it satisfies the strong equal treatment property.
Theorem 2 allows us to state the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1
The value  can be constructed through the average approach using a value for CFF games  that satisfies linearity and equal treatment if and only if  satisfies linearity and strong equal treatment.
As discussed in the Introduction, the most prominent value for CFF games that satisfies linearity and symmetry is the Shapley value. MPW (2007) use the average approach to extend the Shapley value to PFF games. Given that we will use this extension in some of the next sections, and also for completeness, we include it here. It requires defining a dummy player and the dummy player axiom. 
Moving now to PFF games, we say that player  is a dummy player in  ∈ G  if he alone receives zero for any partition of the other players and furthermore, has no effect on the worth of any coalition  (that is, the worth of  in partition  is constant for all possible assignments of player  to some coalition in  ). More formally, player  is a
P4 Dummy player: A value  satisfies the dummy player axiom if for any dummy player  in the game    () = 0.
Adopting this dummy player axiom in combination with linearity and strong symmetry allows identifying a family of values that extend the Shapley value to PFF games.
Theorem 3 (MPW, 2007) The value  can be constructed through the average approach with weights that satisfy
for all  ∈ \ and for all (( ∪ {})  ) ∈ , using a value for CFF games  that satisfies linearity, symmetry, and dummy player if and only if  satisfies linearity, strong symmetry, and dummy player.
Note that the theorem provides a recursive relationship between weights corresponding to different size coalitions due to the dummy player axiom. 8 It rules out several weight systems, among them the simple arithmetic average assigning an equal weight to each partition. 7 For  = ∅ we slightly abuse notation by assuming that the partition ( \(∅ )) ∪ (∅ ∪ {} \{}) also includes the empty set. 8 We note that for  = 3 any choice of weights satisfies equation (1).
Extensions of values with different null player axioms
In this section, we examine the implications of changing the definition of a dummy player in PFF games. Each change allows us to generate a different value for PFF games. In this way, we provide a unified framework, using the average approach together with alternate definitions of a dummy player, to generate several values for PFF games extending known values for CFF games. In the following section we use a different rationale to extend the family of least square values.
Extension of the equal division value
The equal division value distributes the worth of the grand coalition equally among all players. This value, which only takes into account the worth of the grand coalition and ignores the worth of any intermediary organization, is characterized by van den Brink (2007) using the notion of "nullifying players." A nullifying player is one whose presence in a coalition implies that the coalition generates zero worth. Formally, player  ∈  is a Given that any extension for PFF games of   using the average approach only takes into account the value of the grand coalition, it is immediate that such an extension leads to the same value   for any system of weights ((  )) ( )∈ . This allows us to provide the following extension of the equal division value for PFF games. C6 Non-negativity: A value for CFF games  satisfies the non-negativity axiom if for
The natural extension of the non-negativity axiom to PFF games is the following:
Theorem 5 presents a similar result to Theorem 4 using the non-negativity axiom instead of the nullifying player axiom.
Theorem 5 The value  can be constructed through the average approach using a value for CFF games  that satisfies linearity, symmetry, and non-negativity if and only if  satisfies linearity, strong symmetry, and non-negativity.
Extension of the equal surplus value
The equal surplus value distributes "surplus" obtained by the grand coalition equally among all the players. The surplus is defined as the worth of the grand coalition minus the sum of the stand-alone worth of all the players. This value is proposed by Driessen and Funaki (1991), who call it the Center-of-gravity of the Imputation-Set value (the CIS -value). Since then this value has been given various names such as the egalitarian value in Chun and Park (2012) and the equal surplus value in Moulin (2003) , which is the terminology that we adopt in this paper.
Several characterizations exist for the equal surplus value. We first use the one provided by Casajus and Huettner (2014a), which introduces a "dummifying player" axiom.
The presence of a dummifying player in a coalition implies that there are no gains from cooperation and the worth of the coalition coincides with the sum of the stand-alone worth of its players (a no-cooperation scenario). That is, player  ∈  is a dummifying 
using a value for CFF games  that satisfies linearity, symmetry, and dummifying player if and only if  satisfies linearity, strong symmetry, and dummifying player.
Following Theorem 6, Corollary 3, whose proof is immediate, presents and characterizes our proposed extension of the equal surplus value to PFF games. 
The second characterization we focus on is the one proposed by Ju, Borm, and Ruys (2007) as it can be naturally extended to PFF games. 10 
! whenever  is a dummy player in  
Extension of the consensus value
Ju, Borm, and Ruys (2007) introduce the consensus value inspired by a sequential twosided negotiation process through which players proceed to distribute the surplus generated by cooperation. This value has an axiomatic characterization using the neutral dummy player axiom.
C9 Neutral dummy player: A value for CFF games  satisfies the neutral dummy player
! whenever  is a dummy player in 11 Note that the restriction (2) is due to the structure imposed on the weights by either the dummifying player or the ES dummy player axiom. The restriction does not apply to 3-player games when we use the ES-dummy player axiom because in a 3-player PFF game if one of the players, say player 1, is a dummy player, then this game has no externalities. 
Our extension of the neutral dummy player axiom to PFF games takes a similar approach to the one we used in the extension of the ES dummy player axiom.
P9 Neutral dummy player: A value  satisfies the neutral dummy player axiom if
! whenever  is a dummy player in 
We state the result that allows extending the consensus value in Theorem 8 for   3. 12 
using a value for CFF games  that satisfies linearity, symmetry, and neutral dummy player if and only if  satisfies linearity, strong symmetry, and neutral dummy player.
Given that the consensus value is a combination of the Shapley and the equal division values, the weights need to satisfy both conditions (1) and (2), which amounts to condition Interestingly, the value   that is derived from our approach was previously introduced and characterized by Ju (2007) .
It is also worth noting that Ju, Borm, and Ruys (2007) C10 -egalitarian dummy player: A value for CFF games  satisfies the -egalitarian dummy player axiom if   () =   () whenever  is a dummy player in Joosten (1996) shows that the -egalitarian Shapley value for  ∈ [0 1] can be expressed as   () = (1 − )   () +    (). We now extend the -egalitarian dummy player axiom to PFF games as follows:
P10 -egalitarian dummy player: A value  satisfies the -egalitarian dummy player axiom if   () =    ( ) whenever  is a dummy player in  Theorem 9 generalizes the -egalitarian Shapley values for   1 to PFF games. 15 14 For  = 0,   =   and the results hold with condition (1) instead of (3). For  = 1,   =   and the results hold with condition (2) instead of (3). 15 The theorem also holds for  = 1, in which case the value corresponds to the equal division value, but without the condition (1) on the weights, as shown in Theorem 4.
Theorem 9 Let  ∈ [0 1). The value  can be constructed through the average approach with weights that satisfy (1) To introduce the axioms that characterize the LS family, we say that a game ∈   is additive if() = P ∈ ({}) for all  ⊆  and provide the following two axioms:
C11 Inessential game: A value for CFF games  satisfies the inessential game axiom if
C12 Coalitional monotonicity: A value for CFF games  satisfies the coalitional monotonic-
Ruiz, Valenciano, and Zarzuelo (1998) prove that  satisfies symmetry, linearity, inessential game, and coalitional monotonicity if and only if it belongs to the LS family. 16 The LS family includes the least square prenucleolus, defined in Ruiz, Valenciano, and Zarzuelo (1996) , where all the coalitions have the same weights. It also includes the Shapley value.
We extend the additivity property to games with externalities as follows. A game Proposition 1 If the value  satisfies linearity, strong symmetry, and dummy player, then it also satisfies inessential game and coalitional monotonicity.
Conclusion
In this paper we use the "average approach" to extend several surplus sharing methods proposed in the literature for characteristic function form games to partition function form games. Our method can be applied to any value for CFF games that satisfies efficiency, linearity, and symmetry. The axiomatic basis for this approach stems from a natural extension of the symmetry axiom for CFF games to a strong symmetry concept for PFF games.
The extensions of the values make it possible to move from normative and distributive issues pertaining to CFF games to their counterparts in PFF games. They also provide axiomatic characterizations of several values for PFF games. The method may of course be applied to values other than those we discussed in this paper and thus we see it as an expedient link between the analysis of standard transferable utility games and transferable utility games with externalities.
The approach suggested here may also provide a non-cooperative foundation for values similar to the one provided in Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo, and Wettstein (2006) for the Shapley value extension.
Appendix
Proof. of Theorem 1. Suppose that  can be constructed through the average approach (AA) using a value  for CFF games that satisfies linearity and symmetry. Denote by ((  )) ( )∈ the weights used in the AA. Also, we can write   () = P ⊆   ()() for any game  where   () is the value  assigns to player  in the CFF game where the worth of coalition  is 1 and the worth of any other coalition is 0.
By construction,  satisfies linearity. Also, the CFF game  corresponding to   satisfies  () = (  ),  () = 1, and  ( 0 ) = 0 for any  0 6 =  . Therefore,  When   () = 0, we take any ((  ))  ∈P  that depend only on the size distribution of coalitions in  and such that P  ∈P  (  ) = 1 Since   () are the same for all  ∈  as well as for all  ∈ \ and they depend only on the size of , strong symmetry implies first that the weights (  ) are well-defined (that is, independent of  when   () 6 = 0) and secondly that they depend only on the sizes of  and the rest of coalitions in  . Also, since  and hence  are linear, we obtain P  ∈P  (  ) = 1 for all  ⊆ . To conclude, we claim the value  can be constructed through the AA using the value  and the weights (  ). This claim is valid for any game   by construction and by linearity extends to any game in G   Proof. of Theorem 2. In this proof we use a different basis for G  . It is given by   defined by:   (  ) = 1 and   ( 0   0 ) = 0 otherwise. Similar to the case of the canonical basis, the strong symmetry axiom is equivalent to the properties that (a)   (  ) =   (  ) for all   ∈  and for all   ∈ \ and (b) the values for players in  and outside  only depend on the size of  and the size distribution of the coalitions in  , that is, on ( ).
First we prove that strong symmetry implies strong equal treatment. Let players  and  be weakly interchangeable in the game . To show that   () =   (), note that  = X
We divide  into four sets:  1 includes the embedded coalitions (  ) for which   ∈ ;  2 includes those for which    ∈ ;  3 is the set of embedded coalitions for which  ∈  and   ∈ ; and symmetrically for  4 .
By strong symmetry of the value ,   (  ) =   ( ) for any (  ) ∈  1 ∪  2 .
Now we show that
It is easy to check that this mapping is a bijection. Since  and  are weakly interchangeable,
To show that, under efficiency and linearity, strong equal treatment implies strong symmetry we proceed through examining the implications of strong equal treatment on the games   . As noted in the main text, property (a) is satisfied for the games   .
It is easy to check that it is also satisfied for   . That is, the payoffs to players in   are given by two numbers, which we denote by   to players in  and   to players in \.
To show property (b), note that for any (  ) and ( 0   0 ) where ( ) = ( 0   0 ), it is possible to move from (  ) to ( 0   0 ) via a sequence of  0 s where each one is derived from the previous one by interchanging just one pair of players. Then, we show next that for any pair of games      0  0 where ( 0   0 ) is derived from (  ) by interchanging two players  and  we have   =   0  0 , that is, the payoff to players in  in the game   must be the same as the payoff to players in  0 in the game   0  0 . Once we obtain this property, the proof of the theorem will be complete since, by efficiency,   =   0  0 , that is, the payoff to players in \ in   must be the same as the payoff to players in
Assume first that  ∈  and   ∈  . Define the game  =   +   0  0 . Players  and  are weakly interchangeable in . Therefore,   () =   (). By linearity, this implies
In the case where   ∈  , then the proof is trivial because (  ) = ( 0   0 ). In the case where    ∈  , then we can move from (  ) to ( 0   0 ) in the following three steps:
pick  ∈  , switch  and , then switch  and , finally switch  and . The reasoning in the previous paragraph can be sequentially applied to show again that   =   0  0 .
Proof. of Theorem 4. Given Theorem 1, we only need to prove the two nullifying player axioms appearing in the theorem. a) Suppose that  can be constructed through the AA using   . Let  ∈  be a nullifying player in  ∈ G  . By construction,   () =   ().
If  is a nullifying player in  ∈ G  , then (  ) = 0 for all  ⊆  with  ∈ .
Therefore,() = P  3 ∈P (  )(  ) = 0 for all  ⊆  with  ∈  Consequently,  is also a nullifying player in the average game and    () = 0. Hence,   () = 0.
That is,  satisfies the nullifying player axiom. b) If  satisfies linearity, strong symmetry, and nullifying player, then it can be obtained through the AA using a value . Note that a nullifying player  in ∈   is also a nullifying player if we consider as a game of G  . Given that  coincides with  in games without externalities,   () =   () = 0 that is,  satisfies the nullifying player axiom.
Proof. of Theorem 5. a) Suppose that   () =   (). If  ∈ G  is nonnegative, (  ) ≥ 0 for all (  ) ⊆ . Therefore,() ≥ 0 for all  ⊆  and any ((  )) ( )∈  Given that   satisfies the non-negativity axiom,    () ≥ 0 for all  ∈ ; hence,   () ≥ 0 for all  ∈ . That is,  satisfies the non-negativity axiom. b) Proceeding as in part b) of the proof of Theorem 4, given that  coincides with  in games without externalities,  satisfies the non-negativity axiom.
Proof. of Theorem 6. a) Suppose that  is constructed through the AA with weights that satisfy (2) using   . We prove that  satisfies the dummifying player axiom. For any player  ∈ , by the AA,
Using (2), we can write   () as In the corresponding average game  we have  ({}) = (1 (1  1));  ({}) = 0 for  6 =  and  () = 1. Since  =   we obtain   (  ) = 0+ 1  (1 − (1 (1  1))). Since   (  ) =   (  ), we get (1 (1  1)) = 1. Given that the weights associated with all embedded coalitions of the form ({1}  ) for  ∈ P {1} , are nonnegative and must sum to 1 (2) holds.
Proof. of Theorem 7. a) If  is constructed through the AA with weights that satisfy (2) using   , then (5) holds. Moreover, if  ∈  is a dummy player in  ∈ G  ,
Therefore,  satisfies the ES dummy player axiom.
We note that in a 3-players PFF game if one of the players, say player 1, is a dummy player, then this game has no externalities because {2}) ) and similarly for player 3. Hence, equation (6) directly follows from (4) for any weights. b) As in the proof of Theorem 6,  can be constructed through the AA using a linear and symmetric value .  coincides with  on   . Take a game ∈   . A dummy player  in is a dummy player in viewed as a PFF game as well and hence
Therefore,  satisfies the ES dummy player axiom, which implies  =   .
To determine the weights we construct the following PFF game   defined by   ( 
In the corresponding average game  we have
Moreover, the weights associated with all embedded coalitions of the form ({1}  ) where  ∈ P {1} are nonnegative and must sum to 1 we obtain (1 (1  1)) + 1 2 ( − 1)( − 2)(1 (2 1  1)) ≤ 1. Hence, either (1 (2 1  1)) = 0 or 1 2 ( − 1)( − 2) ≤ ( − 2). However, the last inequality cannot hold for   3. Therefore, (1 (2 1  1)) = 0 and (1 (1  1)) = 1. This implies that (2) holds.
Proof. of Theorem 8. a) Suppose   3 and that  can be constructed through the AA with weights that satisfy (3) using   . By Theorem 1, we only need to prove that  satisfies neutral dummy player. For any  ∈ , by the AA,
Suppose now that  ∈  is a dummy player in  ∈ G  . Given the weights in (3),  is a dummy player in as well and hence    () = 0. Moreover, we can write (7) as
Therefore,  satisfies the neutral dummy player axiom. b) Proceeding as before,  can be constructed through the AA using a linear and symmetric value . Take a game. A dummy player  in is a dummy player in viewed as a PFF game as well and hence
given that(  ) ≡() for all (  ) ∈ . Therefore,  satisfies the neutral dummy player axiom, which implies  =   .
We now prove that equation (3) 2 1  1) ).
We know that    (  ) = 1 2    (  ) + 1 2 (1 − 0). Since  can be constructed by the AA using   , 1
. Therefore, it must be the case that
Second, take  ⊂  and  ∈ \. We define the game   as follows:
Suppose   1 Then,
We again proceed to construct the corresponding average game.  () = ( ( 1  1))+ (−−1)( ( 2 1  1)) and  ( ∪{}) = (+1 (+1 1  1)). Player 's marginal contribution to any coalition other than  is zero whereas 's marginal contribution to
Now suppose  = 1 and  = {1}. Then,
Going again through the corresponding average game we obtain. {1} ({1}) = (1 (1  1))+ 2 1  1) ). Player 's marginal contribution to any coalition other than {1} is zero whereas 's marginal contribution to {1}
, it must be the case that
From (9) and (11) we obtain
that is, (2 (2 1  1)) = 1 This implies that (2 ) = 0 for any partition  different from (2 1  1). Also, using (10) recursively, we have  (3 (3 1  1)) =  (2 (2 1  1)) + ( − 3)  (2 (2 2 1  1)) = 1 Thus,  ( ( 1  1)) = 1 for any   1. Also, (2 (2 1  1)) = 1 together with (9) imply (1 (1  1)) + ( − 2) (1 (2 1  1)) = 1Moreover
Then, if   3 it is necessarily the case that (1 (2 1  1)) = 0 and (1 (1  1)) = 0 as well and equation (3) holds. (If  = 3 then (1 (1 1 1)) + (1 (2 1)) = 1 always.)
Proof. of Theorem 9. a) Suppose that  can be constructed through the AA with weights that satisfy (1) for all  ∈ \ and for all (( ∪ {})  ) ∈  using   . By Theorem 1,  satisfies linearity and strong symmetry. We now prove that  satisfies the -egalitarian dummy player axiom.
For any  ∈ , by the AA,
Suppose now that  ∈  is a dummy player in  ∈ G  . Then, given (1),  is a dummy player in as well (see proof of Theorem 1 in MPW, 2007) and hence    () = 0. Sincẽ  () = ( ), (12) implies  satisfies the -egalitarian dummy player axiom. b) We know that  can be constructed through the AA using a linear and symmetric value  and we prove that  satisfies -egalitarian dummy player. Take a game ∈   .
A dummy player  in is a dummy player in viewed as a PFF game as well and hence   () =   () =   ( ) Therefore,  satisfies the -egalitarian dummy player axiom, which implies  =   .
We now prove that (1) holds for all  ∈  \ and for all (( ∪ {})  ) ∈ .
We define the game  ) ). Hence, it must be the case that (( ∪{})  ) = P ∈ \ ( ( \( ))∪((∪{}) )) Finally, we note that (1) trivially holds if  =  − 1.
Proof. of Theorem 10. a) Suppose that  is constructed through the AA using  from the LS family. We prove that  satisfies the inessential game and coalitional monotonicity axioms. 
for any  ∈ . Thus, the value  satisfies the inessential game axiom.
To prove that  also satisfies coalitional monotonicity, let  and  be such that (  )  (  ) and ( ) = ( ) for ( ) 6 = (  ). Theorem 3 ensures that  can be constructed through the AA using some vector of weights . Let and be the average games that use the weights . It is immediate that() =() for all  6 =  and() ≥(). Since   satisfies coalitional monotonicity in CFF games,
for any  ∈ . Therefore,  satisfies the axiom of coalitional monotonicity.
